Discussing China: Sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia  by Peyrouse, Sébastien
Discussing China: Sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia
Sébastien Peyrouse
Central Asia Program, IERES, George Washington University
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 5 August 2015
Accepted 1 October 2015
Available online 10 November 2015
Keywords:
Central Asia
China
foreign policy
sinophobia
sinophilia
trade
A B S T R A C T
In two decades since independence, Beijing has become one of Central Asian countries main
partners. China’s growing presence and inﬂuence in Central Asia partially structures the do-
mestic orders, social changes, and national narratives of the latter. Exactly how China will
intensify its presence in Central Asia is going to depend partly on the approaches and atti-
tudes of the Central Asian states themselves. The rise of Sinophilia and Sinophobia will impact
the political, geo-strategic, and cultural the situation in the region, working either to speed
up or to slow down Chinese expansion in it. The Central Asian states are at once desirous of
the growing Chinese presence, wanting to take advantage of its economic dynamism and geo-
strategic inﬂuence, but also fearful of its potential demographic and cultural clout.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the generally
bad state of Sino-Soviet relations had impeded direct
relations between Central Asia and China. Some trade
relations started in 1982, formally recognized by China
only in 1986, when it began to reform its foreign trade
policies.1 However, with a few exceptions, the Central
Asian federated republics were without any access to the
outside world. In 1991, the arrival of China on their
agenda, both domestic and international, has been sudden.
Establishing direct bilateral relations with Beijing has
required overcoming several extremely negative clichés of
China put about by Soviet propaganda, clichés that rein-
forced Central Asian societies’ already long-standing
apprehensions of their large neighbor. An old Central
Asian tradition, handed down through centuries-old oral
epics, presents China as a distant but recurrent enemy of
Turkic peoples and as an historical opponent of Islam.
However, in two decades only, Beijing has become one of
Central Asian countries main partners.
Chinese interests in Central Asia have been structured
in phases. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, Beijing’s concern
was to sign demarcation treaties, demilitarize the borders,
and prevent the strengthening of Uyghur separatism. In the
second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, it aimed to create
a platform for discussion andmutual discovery, and to build
a collective security framework through the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization.2 In the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, China
moved to establish itself vigorously on the Central Asian
market, mainly in hydrocarbons,3 extractive industries, in-
frastructures, and communications. Finally, since 2005,
Beijing has been trying to establish ways to promote its lan-
guage and culture and to train Central Asian elites according
to the Chinese model. Despite China’s initially negative
overall image in Central Asia, the Middle Kingdom has suc-
ceeded in improving its reputation with soft-power
diplomacy, and drastically changed the economic and
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strategic given on the Central Asian arena.4 It positions itself
as the second most inﬂuential external actor in the region,
surpassing Russia in economic terms, but not strategic or
cultural ones.5
China’s growing presence and inﬂuence in Central Asia
is not limited to changing the international environment of
the new states, or structuring their economic develop-
ment. It also partially structures the domestic orders, social
changes, and national narratives of the latter. Beijing has
made it possible to act as a catalyst for indirect political
debates on the choices made by governments;6 it fosters a
reorganization of the social fabric by giving rise to new pro-
fessional niches that present themselves as “go-betweens”
between China and Central Asia; it is an object of academ-
ic knowledge, and of expertise, and has entered into the
popular imaginary. While in Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan there can be no question of having a genuinely
pluralistic debate on China or any other foreign or domes-
tic policy issues, political life in the other three states does
allow for a greater expression of differences of opinion, giving
the media license to discuss topics other than those direct-
ly involving the presidential family.
China’s inﬂuence in Central Asian countries has raised
controversies, which have ranged from issues of national
integrity to economic questions, and both Sinophile and
Sinophobe groups rapidly formed. Exactly how China will
intensify its presence in Central Asia is going to depend
partly on the approaches and attitudes of the Central Asian
states themselves. For this reason it is essential to compre-
hend not only Chinese objectives in the region but also to
look at the indigenous viewpoints of Central Asian govern-
ments, and their room for initiative on political and
geopolitical issues. Although their scope for action is slight,
the Central Asian governments and their public opinions
ought not to be taken as mere passive objects in a game
between great powers, but as actors in their own right that
have well-established opinions on what they want to obtain
from China and from any other country.
This paper will address the multifaceted impact of the
China factor on Central Asia. It will, ﬁrst, outline China’s
growing political and economic relations with Central Asia
from the fall of the Soviet Union. I will then discuss the emer-
gence of Pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese groups in Central Asia,
their capacity and limits of inﬂuence on Central Asian states
relations with Beijing. This will be followed by an analysis
of the public and experts (academic circles, think tanks, po-
litical circles) opinion on the stakes, proﬁt and risks of the
Chinese presence in the region. The rise of Sinophilia and
Sinophobia will impact the political, geo-strategic, and cul-
tural situation in the region, working either to speed up or
to slow down Chinese expansion in it. The Central Asian
states are at once desirous of the growing Chinese pres-
ence, wanting to take advantage of its economic dynamism
and geo-strategic inﬂuence, but also fearful of its poten-
tial demographic and cultural clout. This research is based
on a ﬁeld research done in the ﬁve Central Asian states and
China over the course of several months between 2008 and
2015.
1. China’s growing presence in Central Asia
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was quick
to become aware of the unique opportunities contained in
this new geopolitical situation, which was not however
without new risks, particularly in relation to its north and
north-west borders. In 1991, Chinese economic power was
still a shadow of what it has become two decades later, and
the idea that the post-Soviet states were new markets to
be conquered had yet to play a major role in Chinese strat-
egies. What dominated were elements of anxiety: despite
the satisfaction of seeing a superpower state like the Soviet
Union disappear, and with it the historical Sino-Soviet con-
ﬂict, Beijing was above all concerned about the impact of
Central Asia’s independence on the situation in Xinjiang, as
well as about the risks of conﬂict linked to the non-
resolution of territorial borders. China questioned 22 percent
of the total surface area of Central Asia: it laid claim to a
territory stretching from Semirechie to Lake Balkhash in Ka-
zakhstan, almost all of Kyrgyzstan, and some 28,000 km2 in
the Pamir region of Tajikistan. However, with the opening
of negotiations, the Chinese authorities toned down their
claims and opted for a “good neighborhood” strategy with
the new independent states. They agreed to reduce their ter-
ritorial claims to “only” 34,000 km2, chieﬂy out of a desire
to secure allies in Central Asia. It signed border demarca-
tion treaties with Kazakhstan in 1994 (some still disputed
zones were settled in 1999), with Kyrgyzstan in 1996 (here
also, resolutions over disputed areas were settled in 1999),
and with Tajikistan in 2002.
The Sino-Kazakh issue of cross-border river manage-
ment however remains unresolved. Both of Kazakhstan’ main
rivers, the Ili and the Irtysh, have their sources in Xinjiang
and in the Chinese Altay. In the framework of the “FarWest”
development program, Beijing has increased its withdraw-
al of water upstream from both rivers. This question of cross-
border rivers has been a topic of negotiations since
Kazakhstan’s independence. Both countries signed a frame-
work agreement for the protection and utilization of cross-
border rivers in September 2001. Nevertheless, the document
does not stipulate any rules for the speciﬁc treatment of the
Ili or the Irtysh, going no further than calling for a “mea-
sured” utilization of commonwaters.7 Nine years later, both
countries ﬁnally declared themselves ready to sign an
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agreement for the protection of both cross-border rivers.8
In 2011 an intergovernmental agreement on the protec-
tion of water quality of cross-border rivers was signed,
according to which both parties are taking on strict obli-
gations tomonitor water quality, but Beijing and Astana have
failed to develop a uniﬁed position with respect to water
intake limits. The problem has therefore yet to be prop-
erly addressed, and China’s attitude reinforces already
prevalent concerns within Kazakh society about its inten-
tions in the region.9
Relations between Central Asia and China have not been
built solely on the resolution of old border issues, but have
also been concerned with managing the diﬃcult Uyghur
question. The Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia includes about
300,000 persons, based mainly in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan.10 In 1996, as tensions becamemore acute in Xin-
jiang, Beijing compelled both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz
governments to dissolve all the autonomist Uyghur
associations.11 Pressure seems to have been applied at the
highest levels, on the presidents directly. Both govern-
ments liquidated the most virulent associations and tried
to inﬁltrate the still existing ones by co-opting some local
Uyghur leaders.12 The Central Asian elites came out of this
experience with a feeling that China could simultaneously
show itself to be a pragmatic economic and diplomatic
partner, ready to foster regional development, but also a
neighbor with which certain limits cannot be crossed when
related to sensitive domestic affairs.
Once the border question was resolved and the Uyghur
problem brought under control, China invested in ques-
tions of security. In 2001 the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), out of the Shanghai Group, was created.
This organization helped to ease long-standing tensions
between the Russian and Chinese worlds, to put in place
cooperative mechanisms for former Soviet states to discov-
er their Chinese neighbor. However, beyond the rhetoric of
cooperation and the declarations of good intentions, it has
experiencedmany diﬃculties. Themember states often have
very divergent domains of predilection, which may under-
mine the credibility of the organization in the mid to long
term. China’s is striving to extent the SCO’s competencies
to the economic sector, which elicited a debate among
member states and revealed their often contradictory in-
terests: both Moscow and the Central Asian states fear that
they will fall under Chinese economic domination and argue
that free trade zones are only possible between countries
that are on the same economic level. Even in its realm of
predilection, security, the SCO is relatively inactive in prac-
tice and unable to compete with Russian inﬂuence. This
organization was not designed to be a supranational orga-
nization, implying the reduced sovereignty of its members,
and therefore does not have a deﬁnedmilitary structure like
the CSTO. Nor is it a military defense alliance like NATO or
seek to create multilateral military or police units.
For the time being, Chinese bilateral military presence
in Central Asia is also limited, unable to rival Russia’s major
role. Its aid is restricted to electronic material, automo-
biles and textiles, and includes almost no military sales
properly speaking. Training aid is attempting to develop,
however modestly. Exchanges have been organized to train
military cadres, but the language barrier hinders pros-
pects. For the Central Asian governments, equipment and
training from the PLA is a still theoretical balance to the sup-
plies of outdated Soviet, but for the time being aid remains
focused on non-military material and involves little
training.13
1.1. Chinese inroads in Central Asia: trade and investments
Growing Chinese inﬂuence impacts not only on the po-
litical and geopolitical situation of Central Asia: it has above
all profoundly changed the economic status quo in the
region. As in the other regions of the world where Beijing
is establishing itself, its settlement strategies respond to
many objectives, seen by the Chinese authorities as intrin-
sically related. First, China consolidates its geopolitical
inﬂuence in Central Asia by creating economically based
good neighborly relations that work to diffuse potential ten-
sions. Secondly, it contributes to regional development in
order to avoid political and social destabilization, which
could have domestic consequences in Xinjiang and slow
down Chinese economic growth. Lastly, the Central Asian
states provide new markets for Chinese products, markets
that could open up to the whole of Russia, Iran, and Turkey.
For landlocked Central Asia, the Chinese economic engine
opens up the prospect of new trans-Eurasian corridors and
is thus seen as a unique historical opportunity.
Between 2002 and 2003, trade increased about 300
percent, going from about US$ 1 billion per year to more
than 3 billion. An increase of 150 percent followed between
2004 and 2006, with trade reachingmore than US$10 billion
according to Central Asian ﬁgures,14 or US$13 billion, ac-
cording to Chinese ﬁgures.15 In the second half of the 2000s,
China closely trailed Russia. In 2008, before the world
economic downturn, trade between China and Central Asia
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exceeded US$25 billion, while trade between Russia and
Central Asia was US$27 billion.16 Since then, China has clearly
gained the upper hand while Russia has stagnated, with
US$29 billion for Beijing compared to less than 22 billion
for Moscow in 2010. In September 2013, Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping, on a trip in Central Asia, raised the initiative
of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road. This initiative, which includes
countries situated on the original Silk Road through Central
Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, calls for the
integration of the region into a cohesive economic area
through building infrastructure, increasing cultural ex-
changes, and broadening trade. Trade has been growing since
2009, reaching in 2014 US$45 billion.17
1.2. China’s place in imports, exports, and the trade total of
Central Asian states in 2014 in millions of US$18
Imports Exports Total trade
Kazakhstan 13,990.1 8816.8 22,806.9
Kyrgyzstan 5769.5 41.8 5811.3
Tajikistan 2716.1 43.3 2759.4
Turkmenistan 1049.1 8651 9700.1
Uzbekistan 2942.1 1451.1 4393.2
The Central Asian states as well as China have every in-
terest in developing theirmutual relations as their economies
aremore complementary than in direct competitionwith one
another. Hydrocarbons –mainly gas from Turkmenistan and
oil from Kazakhstan – are at the forefront of Chinese activ-
ity in Central Asia. But it also aims at a multitude of other
sectors, in particular those linked to infrastructures and com-
munications. China is one of the only external actors present
in Central Asia that attaches such importance to the fre-
quently neglected banking sector, which enables the Central
Asian states to pursue large-scale projects.
China has the capacity to export consumer products to
Central Asia at low prices, which suits the low living stan-
dards of the local populations, whereas Russian, Turkish and
Iranian, not to mention Western, products remain too ex-
pensive. It is also able to provide technological goods to the
middle and upper classes, whose consumption patterns are
in constant rise, in particular in Kazakhstan. Between 80 and
90 percent of Chinese exports to Central Asia consist of ﬁn-
ished, diversiﬁed goods: consumer products, machinery,
processed foodstuffs, textiles, shoes, electronic goods, phar-
maceutical products, automobile parts, etc.19 On the other side,
about three quarters of Central Asian exports to China consist
of rawmaterials, petrol, and ferrous and nonferrousmetals.20
Over the coming decades, Beijing will very likely stay the
foremost economic partner of the ﬁve states; Central Asian
consumers will follow Chinese trends in everyday con-
sumption goods, as well as in high-tech products, but also
partially in foodstuffs. China has become a major, structur-
al actor in Central Asia. It plays a negative role by
transforming the local economies into rawmaterials support
bases, and by destroying, through mechanisms of compe-
tition, the already very limited post-Soviet industrial fabric,
which is a creator of employment. But Beijing also becomes
a key positive element of the transition to the service
economy and to that of new technologies. Its proximity has
proven a guarantee of development and insertion into world
markets. As Kyrgyzstan has shown, the re-export of Chinese
products throughout the rest of Central Asia, and to Russia
and potentially the Middle East, makes it possible to set up
new dynamics that transform the social fabric. Awhole range
of new professions are being structured, all linked to the
service economy: transport, freight, logistics, translation,
legal and commercial services, foreign sales networks, etc.
Since the second half of the 2000s, this niche has been
entered into by the young generations, which ﬁnd in it ways
tomeet their own aspirations. It groundsmastery of market-
economy principles, emphasizes knowledge that is at once
individual (foreign languages) and institutional (universi-
ty diplomas), and enables an opening up to foreign countries
and the earning of much higher revenues than those pro-
vided by traditional tertiary, state-dependent professions
(teaching, medicine).
2. The growing presence of pro- and anti-Chinese
groups in Central Asia?
To date, all Central Asian governments have spoken very
positively about their “excellent relations” with Beijing. They
have encouraged Chinese companies to settle in the country
and declined to comment on contentious issues publicly.
Nevertheless, although Central Asian leaders seem to speak
with one voice on the question of China, their close aides
are not necessarily Sinophile by conviction, but instead
because they have little choice and are driven by a logic that
also has a Sinophobe dimension: a desire to build closer ties
with China because it is better to maintain healthy rela-
tions with a large and feared neighbor.
The presidential families, whose members are often di-
rectly concerned by trade with China, play a key role. In
Tajikistan, one of President Emomali Rakhmon’s sons-in-
law, Hassan Saidullaev, president of the holding company
“Ismaili Somoni XXI Century”, is personally involved in es-
tablishing warm relations between Dushanbe and Beijing. In
Uzbekistan, the eldest daughter of the President Islam
Karimov, Gulnara Karimova, before her disgrace and the col-
lapse of her commercial empire, was also active in the sale
of metal to China.21 Some political ﬁgures are more pro-
China than others, although this by no means implies that
they form an established lobby. Such is the case, for example,
16 2009 European Commission’s statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade
-statistics/ (Accessed November 26, 2009).
17 Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
18 Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
19 For a break-down by product, see H.-L. Wu, and C.-H. Chen, “The Pros-
pects for Regional Economic Integration between China and the Five Central
Asian Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies vol. 56, no. 7 (2004): 1069–1070.
20 Paramonov, and Strokov, Economic Involvement of Russia and China in
Central Asia, no. 6. See also M. Myant, and J. Drahokoupil, “International
Integration and the Structure of Exports in Central Asian Republics,” Eur-
asian Geography and Economics vol. 49, no. 5 (2009): 604–622.
21 The very nature of this information makes the identiﬁcation of their
sources diﬃcult to verify, but it is backed up by numerous local and in-
ternational experts who have gathered this from multiple sources.
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of KarimMasimov, primeminister of Kazakhstan from 2007
to 2012 and again from 2014. Of Uyghur origin, he studied
in Beijing and is ﬂuent in Chinese. He is considered by some
experts to be the representative of the Chinese lobby.
However, Kazakhstan’s pro-Chinese policies are probably not
initiated by speciﬁc PrimeMinisters: The issue of China arises
at the level of the state itself and has nothing to do with the
personality of its leaders. Indeed, never have any of the cou-
ntry’s PrimeMinisters declared themselves to be anti-Chinese,
nor sought to modify the country’s pro-Chinese policies.
Central Asian oligarchswith interests centered on Beijing
turn also out to be the supporters of the pro-Chinese poli-
cies of the authorities. In Kazakhstan, for instance, several
groups are favorable to Sino-Kazakh rapprochement for the
simplypragmatic reason that China is oneof themajor export
markets for Kazakh metallurgy. The ﬁrst is Alexander
Mashkevich’s “Eurasian Group” (Eurasian National Re-
sources Corporation), which controls a third of the Kazakh
economyand is valued at over ﬁve billion dollars; the second
is Vladimir Kim’s company Kazakhmys, which is the cou-
ntry’s largest copper producer. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the
Salymbekov family is quite clearly involved in fostering
friendly relations between Kyrgyzstan and China: it pos-
sesses the largestmarket – the “Dordoi”market – in Bishkek,
and controls the trade ﬂows from China that pass through
Naryn, the region whence the family hails. In Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, there are many heads of large national
companies, in particular in the energy, precious minerals
and railway sectors, which also have personal interests in
maintaining good Sino-Uzbek and Sino-Turkmen relations.
Last, the service secrets, which control the shadow turn-
over of money at the custom borders, are very involved in
business with China. The situation is really complex as the
Central Asian criminal groups specialized in import/export
with China are not only transnationally organized, but also
have very close relations with the political authorities.
These pro-Chinese interests are by no means unique.
Russian companies, for instance, have also been busy in
Central Asia working this same conjunction between na-
tional interests and the personal networks of leaders.
Moreover, although the number of big economic groups
focused on China is growing, the latter cannot yet be said
to form an organized pro-Chinese lobby: if their economic
interests were to develop in an opposite direction, they
would not continue to maintain their loyalty to Beijing for
the sake of it. Finally, the black money spent by Beijing in
Central Asia may help to formalize a contract or to facili-
tate a speciﬁc project, but it does not provide a level of
inﬂuence that could sway high-ranking political deci-
sions. Therefore, there are no lobbies ﬁnanced by China that
have developed independently of political power, and none
that could contradict high-level decisions. This phenome-
non is strengthened by the current collusion in Central Asia
between decision-making circles, high-level functionar-
ies, and private- and public-sector oligarchs.
Beijing has no need to ﬁnance institutional mediators
capable of conveying its viewpoint to decision-making
circles. It is nevertheless likely that such a situation is pro-
visional, for several reasons. First, historically Beijing has
always fostered Sinophile circles in neighboring countries,
and so it seems likely that what happened in South Asia,
where China has managed to co-opt sections of the intel-
lectual and political elite, will also occur in post-Soviet space.
Second, there are Sinophile circles currently being formed
in Russia, where ideological commitments tend to be more
openly proclaimed than in Central Asia. It may be sup-
posed, then, that developments in Russia will also have an
impact on the situation in Central Asia. Last, economic stakes
over the division of the region’s wealth and the conﬂicts of
interest between the great powers in the region will lead
to the formation of pro-Chinese lobbies to counteract the
already extant pro-Russian and pro-western lobbies.
For the moment, the Sinophile circles have barely any
institutional standing. This is the case for twomain reasons.
First, they are situated in the uppermost echelons of society,
that is, among the presidential families, the political elites,
and the private sector oligarchs and directors of large public
companies. These three milieus are already intrinsically
linked through a variety of political, personal, regional, cor-
poratist and clan allegiances. As such they belong to
decision-making circles and work inside the system, so they
have no need to ﬁnance institutional mediators to convey
their viewpoints. Second, were an oﬃcial pro-Chinese lobby
to emerge, it might cause public opinion to react negative-
ly and this might have the possible counter-effect of
generating a structured anti-Chinese lobby.
The Sinophobe circles, in turn, are presently unable to
acquire any institutional standing. The reason for this is that
their critiques of China would directly bear on the authori-
ties’ pro-Chinese policies. This would then put them in an
awkward position because it might induce the state organs
to work against them through administrative obstruction,
legal pressures, extralegal activities, etc. In addition, the anti-
Chinese groups have divided motivations and social
aﬃliations. They are comprised of political opponents,
Uyghur associations, worker’s unions, small business-
people and entrepreneurs, etc., all of whom would have a
diﬃcult time formulating common viewpoints for the
purpose of building genuine cooperation.
3. A very diversiﬁed public and expertise
opinion on China
While the oﬃcial declarations proclaiming the need to
maintain friendly relations with Beijing have been unani-
mous, this has not been the case among the population as
well as among Central Asian experts and academic special-
ists, who present more variegated viewpoints. The “Chinese
question” is becoming increasingly central to political debate
in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular,
political life has come to be stamped by crises and public
debates involving their relations with their great neighbor.
According tomany surveys done these last ten years, thema-
jority opinion is that China remains a challenge for Central
Asia, including on those issues that are presently regarded
as having been resolved. In think tanks and academic circles,
the experts’ understandings of the situation are, in general,
far more critical than those of their political leaders.22 They
22 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, The ‘Chinese Question’ in Central Asia. Do-
mestic Order, Social Changes and the Chinese Factor.
18 S. Peyrouse / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 14–23
do not hesitate to condemn the latter for their lack of good
will to provide more detailed information about Chinese ac-
tivities in Central Asia. Almost all experts express concern
about the silence cultivated by the authorities in relation to
the partnership with Beijing. They worry that the extent of
China’s grip over the region has been concealed. They vig-
orously decry the authorities’ incapacity to make decisions
for the future of the nation and are concerned about the at-
mosphere of suspicion – generated precisely through the
dearth of information – that surrounds the topic of China in
public opinion. Theymaintain that if the issue does not receive
adequate expression, it will only contribute to increasing
social tensions. While some key ﬁgures of the Central Asian
expertise are on record as expressing their unilateral cri-
tiques of Chinese activities, others do not conceal their
appreciation, and even admiration, for China’s dynamism.
However, the majority of experts tend to identify both pros
and cons regarding China’s engagement. This nuanced ar-
gumentation can in part be explained by the variety of issues
involved. In relation to geopolitical issues, China is mostly
viewed as a positive factor, whereas in questions of identi-
ty and culture, it elicits negative reactions.
3.1. China: a trustful geopolitical and security partner?
Most of experts, particularly those in the weakest coun-
tries, namely Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, welcome China’s
stabilizing role in regard to security matters.23 Some remark,
for example, how much more effective the Chinese border
guards are compared to theCentral Asian customsoﬃcers,who
have been corrupted by the drug trade.24 TheywelcomeChina’s
genuine efforts to combat Islamism since this leads it to invest
in Afghanistan, which can only be of beneﬁt to Central Asia as
awhole, especially at a timewhena growingnumber of Central
Asians join the Islamic State in Syria more and more con-
cerns. The Kyrgyz and Tajik experts, who are aware of the
intrinsic weakness of their states, often unreservedly support
China’s security commitments in the region – not tomention
those of other international actors.
For several experts, Chinese policy in Central Asia is not
without ambiguity. There is a prevailing feeling of mistrust
about Beijing’s possible “hidden” objectives. The cession of
some territories to China was viewed very negatively by part
of the populations, especially in Kyrgyzstan, where citizens
thought of Akayev’s regime as capitulator and suspected that
the Chinese would soon lay down additional claims.25 Even
today, the sentiment that this peaceful solution might only
be provisional remains very present in Central Asian public
opinion.26 Not one of the territorial treaties has been pub-
lished, a fact that fuels assumptions about the existence of
possible secret clauses. Legal imprecision is rife and the
question remains open as to whether the treaties are deﬁn-
itive or if they have been established only for a period of
twenty years, as some of the Sino-Russian treaties signed in
the 2000s were.27 The possibility of having to renegotiate
some territories in the decades to come, when the power dif-
ferential in favor of China will be even greater, is a legitimate
public concern in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Opinion remains divided as regards China’s effective ca-
pacity to improve regional security. In a survey conducted
in 2006 among thirty Kazakhstani experts, only 20 percent
thought that Beijingwas going to be amajor player in Central
Asian security; and 44 percent declared that over the short
term it would not even have the least interventional
capacity.28 Last, none of the experts surveyed believed that
Chinese policy was fully compatible with Central Asian in-
terests. Indeed a largemajority among them (three-quarters)
even reckoned that China’s increasing geopolitical inﬂu-
ence would have contradictory effects and basically run
counter to the interests of the Central Asian republics.29 Even
if Beijing strives tomaintain stability, it also discretely fosters
disagreement among Central Asian states. It would try to
prevent the Central Asian states from establishing a common
front that might jeopardize the forward march of its
interests.30 The survey also revealed that 50 percent of
experts placed Russia as their country’s number one partner,
ahead of the U.S. and China, while none placed China ﬁrst.31
The majority of Central Asian experts claim that the only
partner they have who would really be willing to accept the
political and ﬁnancial burden of a military intervention in
case of serious destabilization is Russia. They hold it to be
most improbable that the Chinese armed forces might try
to use the auspices of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Struc-
ture – which they view as an empty shell with virtually no
eﬃcacy – to intervene in Central Asia.32 Even those who see
China as a necessary counterweight to Russia claim that the
arrival of Chinese troops on Central Asian territory would
be opposed by the local governments and would provoke
violent reactions among the population.33 The issue of
China’s potential military presence in Central Asia is indeed
a particularly sensitive one; the idea is widely decried in
themedia, above all in Kazakhstan. It is also decried in popu-
list books, many of which promulgate alarmist perspectives
on the Chinese military’s purportedly hidden presence in
23 Akbarsho Iskandarov, “SHOS: k voprosu o razshirenii”, Analytic, no. 1,
2007, http://www.analitika.org/article.php?story=20070514234555267
(Accessed January 21, 2009).
24 Anonymous interview, Bishkek, February 2008.
25 For more on Sinophobia in Central Asia, see M. Laruelle, S. Peyrouse,
China as a Neighbor. Central Asian Perspectives and Strategies (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Monograph, April
2009).
26 “Kitai zabral kusok Tadzhikistana i na etom ne ostanovitsia?” MKRU,
May 14, 2013, http://www.mk.ru/politics/world/article/2013/05/14/853531
-kitay-zabral-kusok-tadzhikistana-i-na-etom-ne-ostanovitsya.html
(Accessed November 1, 2015).
27 N. Maxwell, “How the Sino-Russian Boundary Conﬂict was Finally
Settled: FromNerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969,”
in A. Iwashita (ed.), Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido: Slavic Re-
search Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), 47–73.
28 V.F. Galiamova and A.S. Kaukenov, “Aktual’nye voprosy razvitiia
kazakhstanskokitaiskikh otnoshenii,” Kazakhstan v global’nykh protsessakh,
no. 1 (2006): p. 107.
29 A. Abdrakhmanov and A. Kaukenov, “Otnosheniia Kitaia i stran
Tsentral’noi Azii glazami kazakhstanskikh ekspertov,” Kazakhstan v
global’nykh protsessakh, no. 3 (2007): p. 123.
30 K.L. Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaia i bezopasnost’ v
Tsentral’noi Azii (Almaty: KISI, 2006), p. 199.
31 Ibid., p. 121.
32 V. F. Galiamova, A. S. Kaukenov, “Aktual’nye voprosy razvitiia
kazakhstansko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii,” p. 117.
33 Interview with Adil Kaukenov, Almaty, February 29, 2008.
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the region.34 Several experts have also expressed direct
concern about Chinesemilitary power. They see Chinesemil-
itary reforms and Beijing’s massive investments in military
technology as being of major concern and as something
Central Asian governments should follow closely.35
The SCO issue seems to be relatively non contentious on
the surface, it is a handy prop for showcasing the good
working relations between China and Central Asia without
having to enter into the details. It is viewed as a valorizing
organization bound to facilitate understanding between
Chinese and Central Asian governments but is not consid-
ered as a real military alliance capable of intervention. The
overall opinion of it is actually positive: it is the one main
organizations to which four of the ﬁve Central Asian states
belong, one of the most focused on by the international
media, as well as one of the only organizations that is not
limited to the post-Soviet space. However, the majority of
researchers doubted the effectiveness of the organization,
especially as an instrument for tackling the important ques-
tions that Central Asia faces and contend that themajor issue
concerning the relationship to China is not multilateral but
bilateral.36 The absence of any binding foreign policy agree-
ment between member states, as well as potential conﬂicts
of interest, is regularly cited as reasons that speak against
the organization:37 The more the organization develops, the
more it is confronted with multiple problems such as the
question of enlargement, rates of unequal development
betweenmember countries, and the competition, or indeed
antagonism, between Russia and China.38 These multiple in-
consistencies are further evident in that the SCO has been
unable to establish any sort of uniﬁed approach to the pri-
orities of its member states.39
However, it is on the level of security that the SCO’s com-
petencies are most discussed because problematic. The gap
between the Organization’s oﬃcial discourse on the ﬁght
against non-traditional dangers and the – quasi-non-existent
– mechanisms in place to enable collective or at least con-
certed action is in fact immense. In the short term, Central
Asian experts doubt the SCO’s capacity to impact upon the
region’s security situation, especially given Russia’s pre-
dominance in strategic partnerships, and the absence of
supranational competencies in the organization. Nor do they
entertain any illusions about the long-term solidity of the
Russian–Chinese partnership, which they think is doomed
to fade in the years to come. Nearly all experts accuse the
SCO of talking too much and doing too little, a reproach that
is usually made to western countries and Russia, but never
to China as a bilateral partner, which is thanked for acting
a lot and talking little. Central Asian experts advance many
reproaches.
The SCO’s refusal to become a discussion platform of
rather “natural” questions suchwatermanagement is serious
as Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek and even Tashkent all have
raised this as being one of the potential elements for re-
gional conﬂict. This issue is often presented as the reason
for the Organization’s great future historical failure.40 This
refusal is explained both by Beijing’s fear of having to take
sides for one state and against another, but also by its not
wanting to have the issue of Sino-Kazakhstanais cross
boundary rivers – i.e., the Ili and the Irtysh – return to the
limelight.41 The Central Asian experts are therefore criti-
cal about the real will of member states to put sensitive
subjects on the discussion table. By dint of endorsing con-
sensus and not raising divergences of interpretation and
interest, the SCO is liable to lose its ability to inﬂuence future
developments.
Lastly, China’s position within the SCO also raises numer-
ous questions, and opinions on this issue diverge accordingly.
The majority of experts agree that the Organization’s stat-
utes make it impossible to curb Chinese expansion in the
region but that at least they provide Moscowwith possibili-
ties to counter Beijing.42 For others, the SCO is an instrument
that directly serves Chinese interests andworks to justify Bei-
jing’s activities in the region in the eyes of the international
community.43 The expression, “China’s soft hegemonism”, pro-
posed by the KISI former expert, Murat Laumulin, especially
through the geopolitical inﬂuence but also through the eco-
nomic investments, in Central Asia, appeals to the majority
of experts.44
3.2. China as economic opportunity or a curse?
The topic of trade and economic relations is highly sen-
sitive. The energy partnership remains one themain topics
discussed by experts and political circles. The numerous
export opportunities offered by China arewelcomed: Beijing
makes it possible to counter the large international majors
that are alreadywell-established, as Chinese ﬁrms offer con-
tracts that are more advantageous for KazMunayGas than
Western ﬁrms. However, the energy issue also raises con-
cerns for others, who think that increased dependency on
China jeopardizes national sovereignty.45 In Kazakhstan,
34 For instance A. Retivykh, Voina za mirovoe gospodstvo (Almaty: Galym,
2006).
35 Interview with Muratbek Imanaliev, Bishkek, February 14, 2008.
36 Askar Abdrakhmanov, Adil Kaukenov, “Otnosheniia Kitaia i stran
Tsentral’noi Azii glazami kazakhstanskikh ekspertov”, pp. 119–129.
37 Klara B. Sher’iazdanova, “SHOS v Tsentral’noi Azii”, in SHOS v poiskakh
novogo ponimaniia bezopasnosti, (Almaty: IIMP, KISI, IWEP, 2008), p. 60;
Erkebulan N. Orazalin, SHOS: osnovy formirovaniia, problemy i perspektivy.
Puti sovershenstvovaniia mekhanizmov sotrudnichestva (Almaty: IWEP, 2007):
93–106.
38 Konstantin L. Syroezhkin, “Rossiia i Kazakhstan v SHOS: problemy i
perspektivy”, Analytica, December 18, 2006, www.analitika.org/
article.php?story=20061218232229163 (Accessed August 3, 2009).
39 Konstantin L. Syroezhkin, “Sammit SHOS: ozhidaniia i real’nost’”,
Analytic, no. 5 (2007): 9–19.
40 M.A. Olimov, “Ispol’zovanie vodnykh resursov v Tsentral’noi Azii:
problemy i ugrozy,” in SHOS v poiskakh novogo ponimaniia bezopasnosti,
(Almaty: IIMP, KISI, IWEP, 2008): pp. 73–74.
41 Interviewwith Sanat Kushkumbaev, researcher at Kazakhstan’s Instittue
of Strategic Studies, Almaty, October 1, 2010; and with Guzel Maitdinova,
the director of the Chaire of International Relations of the Slavo-Russo-
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42 Interview with Nurbek Omuraliev, Bishkek, February 22, 2008.
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(Accessed April 14, 2008).
44 Murat T. Laumulin, “Na grani blefa i real’nosti”, Analytica, June 13, 2006,
http://www.analitika.org/article.php?story=20060613225246616
(Accessed April 14, 2008).
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experts argue that the Kazakh authorities have trans-
ferred too many energy resources into Chinese hands, and
denounce the dangerous opacity that surrounds the award-
ing of tenders for deposits’ exploration and exploitation.46
The Sino-Kazakh pipeline, in addition to its ecological risk,
is suspected of being unproﬁtable to date.47
China is thanked for attenuating Central Asia’s land-
locked character, for building infrastructures (roads, railways,
tunnels, electricity lines, etc.), andproviding consumer prod-
ucts that are appropriate to the low standard of living of
the Central Asian population. However, many Central Asian
specialists are persuaded that Beijing is trying to transform
the economies of Central Asia to suit its own interests,48 to
weaken their potential for autonomy and further to estab-
lish their status as Chinese protectorates dependent onChina
for technological know-how. The key accusation concerns
the restriction of Central Asian economies to the role of pro-
ducers andexportersof primary resources.As experts explain,
Chinese investments are not aimed at the development of
local production but at the creation of conditions to aid the
export of Chinese products and the import of primary re-
sources. The sectors that are most affected by Chinese
competition are light industry, construction (for example,
cement production), processing and agrifood. Losing these
sectorsmay of course jeopardize the country’s security since
these countries would then be dependent on China for its
basic foodstuffs.
Moreover, Central Asian opinion harbors the wide-
spread notion, which is skillfully manipulated in the media,
that Chinese products are of bad quality. Such an opinion
is qualiﬁed bymany experts: This is no longer the case today,
even if, given the particularly low standard of living of
Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek households, the only affordable
Chinese products will necessarily be of low quality. They
shape the question on another way by insisting on the re-
sponsibility of Central Asian businessmen, who purchase
the cheapest Chinese goods in order to maximize their
proﬁts.49 Finally, Kazakh experts often consider that Xinji-
ang’s development is in large part buoyed by Central Asian
resources. The idea of unfair competition in relation to the
economic boom in Xinjiang, a region that was originally
poorer than Central Asia, appears to be a majorly signiﬁ-
cant issue for Kazakhstan.50
3.3. The old clichés legacy: demographic phobias and
cultural apprehensions
The phobias linked to Beijing’s growing presence are quite
advanced in Central Asia. Views of China are still stamped
by the old clichés of Soviet propaganda casting China as the
historical enemy. Discourses on the “Chinese expansion”
(tikhaia ekspansiia) into Central Asia have become fre-
quent in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik newspapers. The idea
that China does not evolve historically, that it pursues
atemporal objectives which stretch across several centu-
ries, or even millenaries, and that the Chinese authorities
in principle conceal their imperialist objectives, are all very
widespread. Beijing is accused of having always devel-
oped policies prejudicial to the nomads and Turkic peoples.
The development program for the “Far West”, in the frame-
work of which Beijing tries to put into reality a settlement
program of establishing hundreds of agricultural hamlets
along the Chinese side of the Kazakh border, which is to be
settled by millions of Han farmers, remains a point of
tension. These highly militarized colonization brigades (Xin-
jiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan) would allegedly be under
the direct control of Beijing and not of Urumqi, and, among
others, have the function of breaking the Turkic popula-
tion continuum between the Central Asians and the Uyghurs.
According to some sociological surveys, while the ma-
jority of respondents contend that immigration of Chinese
citizens will increase in the coming years, more than two
thirds believe that this migration will have a direct or in-
direct negative impact on the domestic labor market. In so
doing, they often deliberately confound the number of mi-
grants who are nationals from neighboring Central Asian
states with the number of Chinese. They also attribute the
increases in criminality in urban zones to the Chinese and
regularly exclaim their alarm at the emergence of Chinese
ghettos in large cities, in particular the Chinatowns in the
capital cities. The tone of the articles is therefore explic-
itly alarmist: “The more that the question of migration is
passed over in silence [by the government], the less chance
we will have to prevent the appearance of Chinese prov-
inces: our descendents will therefore be obliged to undertake
a struggle of national liberation for the resurrection of
Kazakhstan.”51 Chinese diaspora presence would mean po-
litical inﬂuence, as it has been the case in South East Asia
where Chinese would control a part of these countries na-
tional wealth.52“Prioritety vneshnepoliticheskoi orientatsii Kazakhstana,” Analytica, January
14, 2007, www.analitika.org/article.php?story=20070114214001106 (Ac-
cessed November 17, 2008).
46 A. Ashimbaeva, “Starye problemy novoi ekonomiki Kazakhstana,”
Kapital.kz, no. 21 (108), May 31, 2007, republished in CentrAsia, June 2, 2007,
www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1180737420 (Accessed June 5, 2015).
47 Interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov, Almaty, March 5, 2008. G.U.
Khadzhieva, “Kazakhstan i Kitai: strategicheskie podkhody k
ekonomicheskomu sotrudnichestvu,” in Sultanov, and Laruelle, Tsentral’naia
Aziia i Kitai: sostoianie i perspektivy sotrudnichestva, (Almaty: KISI, 2008):
120–129.
48 See the Kazakhstanese political specialist’s opinion A. Arzygulov in:
G. Ashakeeva, A.A. Eshmatov, “Kitai – Central’naia Aziia: Kto za kem?” Radio
Azattyk, March 12, 2013, http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_china
_central_asia/24926252.html (Accessed October 1, 2015).
49 Interview with Akylbek Saliev, Bishkek, February 19, 2008.
50 “Ambicii Kitaia v Central’noi Azii mozhet ostanovit’ evrasiiskaia
integraciia, – molodye eksperty sporiat,” Arba.ru, November 11, 2014,
http://www.arba.ru/forum/6949 (Accessed July 15, 2015).
51 R. Ivahnikova, “Migranty ugrozhaiut suverenitetu nashei strany –
Mavlian Askaberov,” KNews, July 2, 2013, http://www.knews.kg/society/
34065_migrantyi_ugrojayut_suverenitetu_nashey_stranyi__mavlyan
_askarbekov/ (Accessed July 21, 2015); “Politika Kitaia v stranah Central’noi
Azii: ‘Ulibochniy sosed’,” Stan Radar, July 25, 2013; http://www
.stanradar.com/news/full/3733-politika-kitaja-v-stranah-tsentralnoj-azii
-ulybchivyj-sosed.html (Accessed July 21, 2015); Bakhytzhamal
Bekturganova, “Pochemu uezzhaiut liudi iz Kazakhstana? Monitoring ot
ASiP 15 maia 2001 gg.”, Zona.kz, May 15, 2001, http://zonakz.net/oldnavi/
articles/asip150501a.shtml (Accessed August 3, 2008).
52 M. Alimov, “Ubit’ drakona . . . v sebe. Sumeem li my preodelet’
predubezhdennie k Kitaiu?” Central Asia Monitor, September 25, 2014,
http://camonitor.com/13545-ubit-drakona-v-sebe.html (Accessed October
30, 2015).
21S. Peyrouse / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 14–23
Xinjiang is a key element of Central Asian concerns. All
the Central Asian experts denounce the Chinese policy
towards the Uyghurs, insisting on the Chinese refusal to
listen to any autonomist demands, even cultural ones, which
can only encourage radical separatism to take root. They
compare their situation in the Soviet Union with the one
of the Uyghurs now and conclude that China refuses to
promote national minorities. “Analyze the relations of
Chinese power to its national minorities and you will see
the future of the countries that neighbor China”.
Last, Central Asian specialists share the feeling that there
exists a “civilizational difference” between China and Central
Asia. Diverse arguments are used to justify the existence of
this apparently impassable “culture barrier”: some con-
ceive it in terms of Islam, others in terms of Russo-Soviet
acculturation, and still others as involving a difference in
national essences. All experts dismiss the notion that a
Sinicization of Central Asian societies could take place by
any means other than force. They all think it is important
to maintain the “civilizational barrier” between Central Asia
and China on the grounds that falling into the Chinese sphere
of cultural inﬂuence would mean the ethnic disappear-
ance of Central Asian societies. In the long-term outlook,
Central Asian experts hold views of China that are very
largely infused with pessimism. All think that the states of
the region will have inherent diﬃculties in trying to work
the overall power differential with China to their advan-
tage. They consider that the ultimate objective of the Chinese
authorities concerning Central Asia’s independence is par-
ticularly unclear and that nothing prevents the currently
fraternal status quo from one day being thrown into ques-
tion – especially in relation to territorial matters. There is
a predominant suspicion that China still has imperial designs
on Central Asia and merely wants to conceal or delay them.
Even the most optimistic experts, who consider that Bei-
jing’s economic and geopolitical presence is a guarantee of
stability for Central Asia, turn out not to be Sinophiles on
the cultural level. All dismiss the notion that a Sinicization
of Central Asian societies could take place by any means
other than force: Falling into the Chinese sphere of cultur-
al inﬂuence wouldmean the ethnic disappearance of Central
Asian societies.
4. Conclusion
The question of China’s increasing inﬂuence in Central
Asia is a sensitive one and no one has an unequivocal re-
sponse to it. Sinophilia and Sinophobia go hand-in-hand in
Central Asia. Both can be present in the same person de-
pending on the angle of view or the question being
addressed. However, Sinophobia is becoming increasingly
prominent, a phenomenon that might have long-term social
consequences.
Business people formwhat is probably themost complex
group, prone to developing convictions that are both
Sinophile and Sinophobe. All have gained from the boom
in commercial trade with China, but some fear Chinese com-
petition. This fear is most developed in countries like
Kyrgyzstan where the bazaar economy has come to play a
central role in economic life but has also sowed the seeds
of destabilization; the business circles are at the very core
of the process of state collapse and corruption, and thus
comprise a politically and socially sensitive milieu which
reacts ﬁtfully to the Chinese presence. In Kazakhstan, the
sense of competition with Chinese traders is less pro-
nounced, because the latter have fewer rights to establish
businesses, but also because they engage more in large-
scale trade, which is better regulated, and because fewer
Kazakhs work in the small retail trade. In Tajikistan the case
is somewhat different: the high rates of emigration to Russia
have enabled Chinese businessmen to invest in the market
without provoking feelings of competition, although Tajik
businessmen resentment against Chinese is growing. In
neither Uzbekistan nor Turkmenistan do business circles
come into direct contact with Chinese businessmen, al-
though there appear to be tensions between Chinese and
Uzbek traders at the Karasuu bazaar.
In the intellectual milieus, the question of China gives
rise to more andmore debates as does the relationship with
Russia, the West, or Turkey, although China is not – yet –
considered as bearing a choice of civilization – unless as a
threat – which might carry Central Asia in a new direc-
tion. Admirers of the Chinese political system are extremely
few in number, with those in favor of authoritarian regimes
as the only counterweight to Islamism or “democratic chaos”
endorsing the example of Russia or Belarus, or advocating
for a speciﬁc national model. In short, they are not in-
spired by Chinese-style monopartyism or references to
Beijing’s communism. Those who consider themselves to
be part of the “Soviet” or “Eurasianist” tradition are pleased
about the Sino-Russian alliance against the West, but give
their clear preference to the Russian model. Those with a
Western, pan-Turkic, or Islamic orientation view China neg-
atively, believing that it hinders the evolution of their
societies in the desired direction. While there are pro-
Western, nationalist, pan-Turkic, or Russophile ideological
traditions, very few scholars in Central Asia calls for a cul-
tural choice in favor of China. Though Beijingmay be thanked
for its economic aid and anti-American geopolitical inﬂu-
ence, on questions of identity scarcely any experts can be
classiﬁed as Sinophile.
In the public opinion, in contrast to Russia which, for
better or worse, is one of Central Asia’s long-standing part-
ners, and to the West, which is often mythologized, China
still belongs to the domain of the unknown for most ordi-
nary Central Asians. Public opinion actually displays much
greater interest in the socio-demographic situation in China,
and in questions of economic development and foreign
policy, than in Chinese culture. Awareness of China, its tra-
ditions, and culture remains weak, while phobias andmyths
on this country are increasing.53 The available surveys reveal
that Soviet clichés have been replaced over the last two
decades with criticisms of the poor quality of Chinese prod-
ucts and fears of the “yellow peril.” Violent incidents over
the last several years which targeted Chinese traders in
Central Asian markets, as well as increasingly virulent dis-
cussions in local newspapers about the potential
consequences of China’s economic presence and political
53 On these myths, see: Dosym Satpaev, “Kitaiskaia Ekspansiia: Mify i
realii.”
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inﬂuence, demonstrate the sensitivity to this topic in the
region. This growing sinophobic feeling is being used more
and more by some nationalist political circles today, as for
example in Kyrgyzstan, where some groups even justify po-
lygamy in order to counter the loss of identity which
supposedly would result, among other things, from the
growing presence of Chinese migrants and their inter-
marriage with Central Asian women.
The relationship with China in its apparent contradic-
tion – both Sinophobe and Sinophile evolves according to
the temporal scale one uses (rather positive in the short
term, rather dangerous in the long term); it is relational
(China relative to Russia is not China relative to the West,
or China relative to Islamism); and it depends on the ob-
jective which is at issue, such as short-term political stability,
the struggle against so-called non-traditional threats,
long-term economic development, human security (food,
environment, health, education), or the survival of the nation
as imagined community. The “Chinese question” there-
fore provides some catharsis for the Central Asians’ collective
and individual reﬂections about the changes that they have
endured over the last two decades. Like all other coun-
tries, Central Asian states have to manage the advantages
and disadvantages afforded by the globalization of markets,
watch as sections of their economies collapse and others
emerge, undergo often painful transformations of the social
fabric, articulate their security and economic imperatives,
assess the long-term demographic and environmental stakes,
and, last but not least, project themselves as fully-ﬂedged
participants in global affairs, all the while preserving a col-
lective identity founded on myth-making and everyday
citizenry.
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